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P.: Judgment Lien--Doctrine of Relation Back--Notice of Suit as Notic
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
elements "rummaging through" the files of the Department of Justice

on a "Roman holiday."
R. G. P.
JUDGMENT LiEN-DocRINE OF RELATioN BAcK-NoncE OF SUrT
AS NOTIcE OF LmiE.-A began a personal action against B in June,

1953, which was matured for trial at the term which began on
September 2, 1953. The trial of the case was begun on October 12,
1953, resulting in a judgment for A, rendered on November 17, 1953.
Cs, attorneys for B, to secure payment of legal fees, obtained from B
a deed of trust on certain real estate, executed on October 13, 1953.
In a partition suit in which all lienholders were named defendants, a
special commissioner in chancery designated A's judgment as fifth
and Cs' deed of trust sixth in order of priority. Upon exceptions, the
circuit court entered a decree holding that Cs' deed of trust was
entitled to be fifth in order of priority. Held, that sufficient time
having elapsed for the case to be matured for trial at the September
term, the judgment rendered on November 17, 1953, related back
and became effective on September 2, 1953, the first day of the
term, taking priority over the deed of trust of Cs who were not
purchasers for value without notice. Cooper v. Cooper, 98 S.E.2d
769 (W. Va. 1957).
W. VA. CODE c. 38, art. 3, § 6 (Michie 1955), upon which the
decision is predicated, is as follows:
"Every judgment for money rendered in this state, other
than by confession in vacation, shall be a lien on all the real
estate of or to which the defendant is or becomes possessed
or entitled, at or after the date of the judgment, or if it was
rendered in court, at or after the commencement of the term at
which it was so rendered, if the cause was in such condition
that a judgment might have been rendered on the first day of
the term ... ."
At common law, by a legal fiction, the whole term is considered
as but one day, and the rule is that a judgment rendered on any day
has relation to and is a judgment of its first day. 2 F~mAN, JuDc,nmrs § 976 (5th ed. 1925). The statute is merely declaratory of the
common law. Smith v. ParkersburgCo-operative Assn, 48 W. Va.
232, 37 S.E. 645 (1900); Dunn's Eers v. Renick, 40 W. Va. 349, 22
S.E. 66 (1895). The court in the principal case, at page 773, declares
that "the manifest purpose of that part of the statute is to prevent
claimants from obtaining any advantage over one another by reason
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of one obtaining an earlier trial date than another at the same term
of court." The revisor's note to VA. CODE § 6470 (1919), from which
the above provision is taken, illustrates the necessity for such a
doctrine.
There has perhaps been a tendency to regard the statute as
intended solely for the purpose of establishing priority between
creditors and as having no application to situations involving the
question of priority between creditors and purchasers. Despite the
court's declaration as to the purpose of the statute, the holding in the
principal case makes it clear that the provision is not so limited. Nor
has it been so limited in the past. In Dunn's Et'rsv. Renick, supra,
the question involved was whether the time in which a bill of review could be brought should be computed from the rendition of
the judgment or from the beginning of the term. In Smith v.
Parkersburg Co-operative Assn, supra, a judgment rendered after
the execution of an assignment for the benefit of creditors was held
to be superior to the assignment. In another case, In re McGraw, 254
Fed. 442 (N.D. W. Va. 1918), the statute was considered in determining whether a judgment was obtained more than four months
prior to the filing of a petition in bankruptcy against the judgment
debtor.
It is established that a creditor secured by a deed of trust on the
debtor's property is a purchaser for value and the lien of the deed
of trust is superior to the lien of an unrecorded judgment of which
he had no notice at the time the deed of trust was executed and
recorded. Souders v. Leatherbury, 97 W. Va. 31, 125 S.E. 236
(1924). In the principal case, appellees attempted to show that they
were purchasers for value without notice. W. VA. CODE c. 38, art. 3,
§ 7 (Michie 1955), is in the following language:
"No judgment shall be a lien as against a purchaser of real
estate for valuable consideration without notice, unless it be
docketed.., in the county wherein such real estate is, before
a deed therefor to such purchaser is delivered for record to the
clerk of the county court of such county....
Here the deed of trust was executed and recorded before the
judgment was rendered. Should a creditor docket his judgment
immediately upon obtaining it, it would, in every case, be too late
to give notice to persons who purchase from the debtor prior to
rendition of the judgment. The statute affords a creditor incomplete
protection and clearly favors purchasers for value without notice.
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Where, as in the principal case, the action is one for a money judgment, a notice of lis pendens is ineffective as notice to a pendente
lite purchaser. The notice of lis pendens has application only where
the action or proceeding is one to enforce ".... any lien upon, right
to, or interest in designated real estate." W. VA. CoDE c. 55, art. 11,
§ 2 (Michie 1955). And the filing of a notice stating that the ultimate object of the suit is to obtain a lien on all the debtor's property
is not notice to a purchaser of a prior lien. White v. Perry, 14 W. Va.
66 (1878).
The following statement of the court's holding appears in
syllabus 2 of the principal case:
"Code 88-8-7, relating to the docketing of judgment liens,
was enacted for the protection of purchasers for valuable consideration without notice, and has no application to and will
not serve to protect one who accepts a deed of trust as security
for a note when he is fully aware and has actual notice of a
suit which resulted in a judgment."
It is unfortunate that the statute mentioned above refers to
notice in such general terms, with regard to judgments. The latter
part of the provision, relating to the docketing of executions, is
more specific. As the provision is initially concerned with the
docketing of judgments, it is apparent that the term "notice" as
used therein has reference to judgments. Just as a judgment cannot
be docketed until rendered, for the same reason, there can be no
notice of such judgment. Until its rendition, there is nothing in
existence which can legally be designated a judgment. And as the
statute states that the "judgment . . . shall be a lien", obviously
there can be no lien without a judgment.
It will be noted that § 7 quoted above nowhere mentions
"suit". Yet, under the holding in the principal case, one who is
"fully aware and has actual notice of a suit" which results in a judgment, cannot be a purchaser without notice. This seems to be an
unwarranted extension of the doctrine of notice. However, as the
purchasers in the principal case were attorneys actually engaged in
the defense of the action in which the judgment was rendered, and
as the principal case was a proceeding in chancery, the decision
might, on equitable principles, be justified. Should the point again
arise on similar facts but involving a purchaser further removed
from the action in which a judgment is sought, the court might be
moved to distinguish this case upon those grounds.
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Upon practical considerations the holding is regrettable. The
mischief which may result therefrom is readily apparent. Land
transfers thought to be valid when consummated may now be attacked upon the ground that the sale was made after the beginning
of a term of court at which a judgment was rendered against the
vendor and that the purchaser had notice of the litigation. Land titles
certified as good may, under this holding, prove to be bad. The
result may be to slow up land title certification. The effect on
prospective vendors of land against whom litigation is pending may
be disastrous. At perhaps the most profitable and convenient time
to sell, the vendor, by reason of the suits pending, will find that he
cannot convey a clear title. This follows in spite of the fact that no
judgment may in fact be later rendered so as to become a lien from
the beginning of the term.
The decision leaves many questions hanging. What is included
within the terms "fully aware and has actual notice of a suit"? Will
any knowledge of a suit pending, however slight, be sufficient? In
suits involving the question of marketable title, will the fact that
an action is pending against the vendor justify the vendee in refusing to complete the contract of sale?
The case points up the fact that the statutes relating to notice
are too uncertain to afford a purchaser protection against the lien of
a judgment under the relation back doctrine, or to afford a creditor
sufficient protection for his lien under that doctrine during the pendency of the action in which he obtains a judgment. The problems
might easily be settled by legislation. One solution might be to require the filing of a notice of lis pendens as a prerequisite to allowing
the lien of a judgment to relate back to a time prior to the date of its
rendition. As a matter of precaution, attorneys will probably file a
notice of lis pendens in every action. Although it will not operate as
constructive notice, its presence in the lis pendens record will probably be considered actual notice to anyone examining the records
and finding it.
L. L. P.
MuNicrPAL CoPpoRAmoNs-BEPAYmxr

oF ADANcEs FHOm

Pnocxns OF Pb
o BoNDs NOT Wrranm DEBT LMTATioNS. Action by the United States against the City of Charleston for advances made under War Mobilization and Reconversion Act 1944,
58 STAT. 785. The city received the advances for the purpose of
conducting advance planning on the feasibility of constructing and
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